3rd MarDiv (-) Rein
N. Command OPCON
Joint Task Force-Red Sea (JTF-RS)
USMEDITCOM
May 2025
TOP SECRET
From: C.O., 27th RLT
To: CMG, 1st MarDiv, (-) Rein.
Subj: Operation Red Crescent: Gulf of Tonkin in the Red Sea.
Ref. (a) MCO 5750.4
(b) FMF Pac 5750.8
(c) DivO 57550.2B
Encl: 1. In accordance with the above provisions of references (a), (b), and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted herewith.
PART I: OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
PART II: OPERATION RED CRESCENT
PART III: ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
PART IV: CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
PART V: OUTCOME
PART VI : SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
PART I: OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
1. Scenario: Operation Red Crescent
a. A deliberate leak of fabricated intelligence—staged through a compromised Signal chat group—triggers a manufactured crisis mirroring the Gulf of Tonkin incident, enabling unilateral military action in Yemen while bypassing the War Powers Resolution.
2. Gulf of Tonkin Parallel
a. Within hours, the administration announces that a U.S. destroyer was "targeted" by Houthi forces in international waters, citing the Signal leaks as corroboration. No physical evidence is provided, but the narrative dominates cable news.
b. The president declares a "national emergency" under the War Powers Resolution’s Section 2(c), framing the incident as an attack on U.S. armed forces.
3. Bypassing Congress
a. Invoking the 2002 AUMF (Authorization for Use of Military Force), the president orders 2,000 Marines into Yemen for a "limited defensive operation" against Houthi positions, asserting constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief.
b. The administration claims the 60-day withdrawal clock does not apply because Congress "implicitly authorized" force via past AUMFs. Legal experts denounce this as a distortion of the War Powers Resolution’s intent.
PART II: OPERATION RED CRESCENT
1. Location
a. Bab el-Mandeb Strait
(1) The strategic chokepoint between Yemen and Djibouti, where Houthi forces have recently targeted international shipping.
(2) This area mirrors the Gulf of Tonkin's geographical significance as a contested waterway.
2. Units
a. U.S. Carrier Strike Group (e.g., Eisenhower-class CSG with Arleigh Burke destroyers like USS Mason).
b. Houthi Naval Forces: modified fishing boats, drone swarm platforms, and coastal defense missiles).
c. Autonomous USVs (Saildrone Voyager-type unmanned vessels conducting ISR missions).
3. Hypothetical Scenario
a. Provocation Phase: A U.S. destroyer (e.g., USS Gravely) supports allied shipping protection missions while unarmed reconnaissance drones map Houthi coastal positions.
b. Initial Incident: A Houthi drone swarm approaches the destroyer at night, with radar returns misinterpreted as hostile attack patterns, (paralleling the 4 August 1964 "phantom attack" radar errors).
c. Escalation: A nearby unmanned surface vessel (USV) suffers apparent damage, with real-time sensor data ambiguously showing either:
(1) Actual Houthi ASBM launch (anti-ship ballistic missile).
(2) Friendly fire incident during defensive engagements.
4. Potential Aggressors
a. Non-State Actors: Houthi forces using deniable asymmetric tactics.
b. State Sponsors: Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) advisors providing targeting data.
c. Autonomous Systems: Malfunctioning USVs or spoofed drone signals creating false attack narratives.
5. Key Differences from Tonkin:
a. Multi-Domain Threats: Modern scenario involves drone swarms, cyber spoofing, and satellite targeting vs. 1964's torpedo boats.
b. Unmanned Systems: Saildrone-type USVs now provide both ISR capabilities and potential deception vectors.
c. Information Warfare: Social media amplifies real-time claims/counterclaims before official investigations.
PART III: ORGANIZATIONAL DATA
1. Naval Units in Red Sea Operations (2025):
a. USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) with Carrier Strike Group 1 (CSG-1):
(1) USS Princeton (CG-59) – Ticonderoga-class cruiser with Aegis combat systems.
(2) USS Sterett (DDG-104)/ USS William P. Lawrence (DDG-110).
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers specializing in multi-mission roles and missile defense.
b. USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) – Nimitz-class carrier conducting strike operations against Houthi targets.
c. USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) – Recently active in sustained combat operations (late 2023–2024) with CSG-2:
(1) USS Philippine Sea (CG-58) – Guided-missile cruiser.
(2) USS Laboon (DDG-58)/ USS Mason (DDG-87)/ USS Gravely (DDG-107). Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
d. USS Carney (DDG-64). Arleigh Burke-class destroyer engaged in missile defense for commercial shipping.
2. Houthi Forces
a. Coastal Missile Units – Anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and drones.
b. Naval Asymmetric Assets – Modified fishing boats, speedboats, and helicopter-borne boarding teams.
c. Unmanned Systems – Saildrone-type USVs and reconnaissance drones conducting ISR missions (implied by Houthi targeting patterns and U.S. force posture).
3. Operational Context
a. The U.S. maintains two carrier strike groups in the region as of March 2025, with CSG-1 (Carl Vinson) joining CSG-12 (Harry S. Truman) to counter Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
b. The Eisenhower CSG completed historic deployments in 2024, engaging Houthi drone swarms and ASBMs.
c. Houthi forces leverage deniable asymmetric tactics, including missile launches from civilian areas and maritime drone deployments.
PART IV: CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
1. Phase 1: Covert Operations & Initial Engagement
a. T-7 Days: U.S.-allied forces conduct clandestine operations near hostile coastal territories (e.g., Houthi-controlled Yemeni ports), including electronic surveillance and partner-nation sabotage missions against radar/communication infrastructure.
b. T-2 Days: U.S. destroyer patrols begin signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection in contested waters, mirroring DESOTO missions, while regional allies execute parallel coastal raids.
c. T-0 (Incident Day): Patrol boats from hostile force approach U.S. vessel in international waters. After warning shots, brief exchange occurs – one boat damaged, no U.S. casualties.
2. Phase 2: Signalgate Breach as Catalyst
a. A covert White House faction intentionally includes a journalist in an encrypted Signal group (dubbed "Red Sea Ops"), where senior officials discuss unverified "intelligence" about an imminent Houthi attack on a U.S. naval vessel in the Red Sea.
b. Fabricated screenshots and audio clips are planted in the chat, falsely depicting Houthi commanders planning a missile strike. The journalist publishes the details, sparking media frenzy.
3. Phase 3: Fabricated/Second Incident
a. T+3-5 Days: U.S. deploys second destroyer; intercepts ambiguous communications suggesting imminent attack.
b. T+6 Days: In poor weather/night conditions, radar anomalies and sonar misreadings prompt crews to report torpedo attacks. Initial strike claims reach policymakers before debunking.
c. T+7 Days: Presidential address announces "unprovoked second attack," releasing selectively edited SIGINT intercepts to validate narrative.
PART V: OUTCOME
1. Phase 4: Legal Escalation
a. T+7-10 Days: White House submits draft resolution to Congress invoking:
(1) War Powers Resolution: 60-day clock starts upon formal notification.
(2) Gulf of Tonkin Parallel: "Blank check" language authorizing "all necessary measures."
b. T+14 Days: Congressional hearings highlight disputed evidence, but resolution passes citing imminent threat to naval forces.
2. Phase 5: Military Buildup
a. T+21 Days: Carrier strike group deployment announced. First retaliatory strikes hit coastal defense sites. No-Fly Zone declared.
b. T+30 Days: "Freedom of Navigation" patrols intensify within 12nm territorial claims, testing red lines. No-Fly Zone expanded.
3. Phase 6: USMC beach landing (See SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS).
4. Phase 7: Phase 5: Institutional Aftermath
a. T+60 Days: War Powers clock expires; administration seeks AUMF extension citing "ongoing hostilities."
b. T+90 Days: Classified review reveals initial incident stemmed from proximity to covert ops, but congressional repeal efforts fail.
c. T+120 Days: Pentagon whistleblower leaks highly classified files surrounding Signalgate conspiracy to NY Times and Washington Post.
d. T+130 Days: Congressional hearings disintegrate into unverified accusations and shouting matches.
PART VI: CONCLUSION
1. Key Legal Triggers
a. War Powers Resolution Activation: Hostilities initiation requires presidential report within 48 hours, starting 60-day withdrawal clock.
b. AUMF Strategy: Broad authorization sought using "pattern of attacks" justification rather than single incident.
c. Article II Arguments: Executive branch asserts constitutional authority for "self-defense strikes" without congressional approval.
2. The "Tonkin Template"
a. This model adapts covert ops overlap, disputed second incident, rapid legislative action to modern Red Sea dynamics, accounting for post-Vietnam legal constraints like the War Powers Resolution.
3. Summary of Military Posture
a. This scenario reflects current Red Sea tensions where U.S. Navy task forces (including CSG-2 with Eisenhower) actively counter Houthi threats.
b. Testing new unmanned systems vulnerable to both technical failures and asymmetric attacks.
c. The complex electronic environment creates similar "fog of war" conditions to the 1964 radar misinterpretations.
PART VII: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
I. OPERATION STEEL SHORE:
1. USMC shore landing Yemen, unit names inclded, debarkation from ships Red Sea.
a. Naval Task Force Composition:
(1) USS America (LHA-6) - Aviation-centric amphibious assault ship; SS San Antonio (LPD-17) - Transporting 14th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU); USS Carter Hall (LSD-50) - Carrying amphibious vehicles and LCACs.
b. Carrier Support:
(1) USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) - Fixed-wing close air support (F/A-18E/F Super Hornets); SS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) - F-35C stealth fighters from VFA-97 "Warhawks."
c. Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF):
(1) 14th Marine Expeditionary Unit: Ground Combat Element: 1st Battalion, 4th Marines ("China Marines"); Aviation Combat Element: HMM-364 "Purple Foxes" (MV-22B Ospreys, CH-53E Super Stallions); Logistics Combat Element: Combat Logistics Battalion 14.
2. Debarkation Sequence
a. Pre-Assault Phase: B-2 Spirits from Diego Garcia conduct MOP bunker-buster strikes on coastal defenses.
b. DDG-108 USS Wayne E. Meyer provides naval gunfire support.
c. Amphibious Landing:
(1) LCACs from Carter Hall deliver AAV-7A1 Amphibious Assault Vehicles (1st Platoon, Alpha Company).
(2) LCU-1700-class vessels disembark Zodiac CRRCs with Force Reconnaissance Company.
(3) MV-22B Ospreys insert 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines ("The Cutting Edge") via vertical envelopment.
d. Beachhead Establishment: M142 HIMARS from CLB-14 set up firebase positions. RQ-21 Blackjack UAVs conduct overwatch (VMU-3 "Eyes of the Corps"). LAV-25 armored vehicles secure flanks (2nd LAR Battalion).
e. Supporting Operations: NSWU-10 (Naval Special Warfare Unit) conducts underwater beach reconnaissance. MH-60S Knighthawks (HSC-23) perform combat search-and-rescue standby.
f. Logistical Pipeline: Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS) system established within 72 hours. KC-130J Super Hercules (VMGR-352 "Raiders") provide aerial refueling.
g. Strategic Enablers: MAGTF-C2 systems integrate with USS Truman's E-2D Advanced Hawkeye for airspace deconfliction. GBU-53/B StormBreaker smart munitions (F-35C-compatible) for precision strikes.
3. Summary: This concept leverages current Red Sea naval deployments,
Chinese militia counter-tactics analysis, and Marine Corps University doctrinal studies, emphasizing distributed operations and multi-domain integration..
II. HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO
Hypothetical Red Sea Incident Scenario: "Bab el-Mandeb Crisis"
(Modern Gulf of Tonkin Parallel)
1. Phase 1: Provocation & Ambiguity Event:
a. A Houthi-modified fishing boat (mounted with cameras and GPS spoofers) approaches the USS Gravely (DDG-107) near Yemen’s Hodeidah coast at dusk. Simultaneously, Iranian-supplied drones (Shahed-136 variants) mimic attack patterns but remain outside weapons range.
b. Misinterpretation: Radar/Electronic Warfare (EW) systems on the Gravely detect "hostile intent" due to spoofed signals simulating missile lock-ons. Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV) Nomad-7 (Saildrone Voyager) reports "kinetic contact" – later revealed to be a collision with a Houthi drone boat.
2. Phase 2: Escalation & "Attack":
a. Night Engagement: USS Mason (DDG-87) fires SM-2 missiles at radar returns initially classified as "inbound ASBMs" – later assessed as false targets from EW spoofing. Houthi social media releases footage of a burning fishing boat, claiming a "US war crime."
b. Critical Ambiguity: Classified SIGINT intercepts show IRGC advisors discussing "Phase Two operations" – but timestamps are unclear if pre- or post-incident. Thermal imagery of the Nomad-7 damage is inconclusive: Houthi drone shrapnel vs. U.S. CIWS misfire.
3. Phase 3: Diplomatic Crisis
a. Houthi Narrative: Claims "unprovoked U.S. aggression" and vows to blockade the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Releases AI-generated audio of a "U.S. sailor admitting fault" (later debunked by voiceprint analysis).
b. U.S. Response: CSG-1 (Carl Vinson) deploys F/A-18E/F Super Hornets for show-of-force strikes on Houthi radar sites. Pentagon briefings emphasize "self-defense protocols" but acknowledge "gaps in unmanned system threat recognition."
4. Phase 4: Unintended Consequences
a. Regional Escalation: Iran deploys Shahid Mahdavi (converted container ship) to "monitor" U.S. movements, escalating tensions. Commercial Shipping reroutes via the Cape of Good Hope, spiking global oil prices by 9%.
b. Policy Impact: UN Resolution 2721 demands independent investigation – vetoed by Russia/China. U.S. Congress debates repeal of 2001 AUMF, citing parallels to Tonkin’s "intelligence failures."
5. Key Differences from 1964 Tonkin:
a. Information Warfare: Viral deepfakes and encrypted IRGC-Houthi comms create "narrative fog."
b. Autonomous Systems: MQ-9 Reaper drones provide real-time footage conflicting with shipboard sensors.
c. Multi-Domain Complexity: Cyberattacks on AIS (ship tracking) systems sow confusion about vessel identities.
6. Summary: This scenario highlights modern hybrid warfare risks, where unmanned systems and information operations amplify the "fog of war" – requiring robust ROE and AI-assisted threat verification.
Report Data: Perplexity.AI
Image: USS Maddox 731: https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/ships/modern-ships/uss-maddox.html
Prepared by: JCL, Pvt., (212xxxx-2533) USMC, 27th RLT-HQ, (AT998687)
JTF-RS 2025
3/LRC/cr1/5750
CMCC NR _____3______
Ser. No. 040-25
COPY _1__ OF __10__COPIES
May 2025
End of Report.
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